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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tinuous unilateral reinscriptions without adjudication or settle-
ment of a claim. The ordinary prescriptions under the Civil
Code are subject to interruption by acknowledgment, but by
reason of the strict interpretation of this statute the prescrip-
tion provided would be a peremptory one like a period of for-
feiture.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Occasionally, the juxtaposition of circumstances produces
curious results. If a squatter occupies a piece of property with-
out any color of right but physically fences it in and keeps
everybody out, he is possessing "as owner," and after thirty
years he acquires the legal ownership by acquisitive prescrip-
tion. On the other hand, when a municipality revokes the dedi-
cation of certain streets which then revert to the ownership of
private individuals, who are unaware of the revocation, such
persons do not possess "as owners" and cannot prescribe. This
latter situation happened in the case of Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp.
v. Weber.' Since the revocation ordinance had not been re-
corded, the transactions based on the existing records were
protected. The public records doctrine prevails against an un-
recorded assertion of ownership, but it yields to a proper claim
of acquisitive prescription. An unrecorded basis of ownership
being precluded, the attempt was made to plead good faith pre-
scription, but lack of knowledge of the unrecorded revocation
ordinance prevented possession "as owner. ' 2 Presumably, the
ordinance could not be a "just title" either, since the person did
not know about it and could not claim it as the basis of a belief
of ownership. There is unavoidably something disturbing about
the conclusion that a person to whom ownership of property
has reverted is denied the benefits of this ownership because
the municipality failed to notify him or to record its revocation
ordinance, without belaboring the fact that the municipality
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 149 So. 2d 101 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963), writ refused, judgment correct,
244 La. 205, 151 So. 2d 493 (1963).
2. LA. CiviL CODE art. 3478 et seq. (1870).
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itself (as record owner) derived the financial benefits of the
mineral lease on the property.
When land is not fit for cultivation or habitation, it is not
so easy to establish the kind of possession necessary for thirty-
year prescription. A good discussion of this problem, together
with the citation of several relevant cases, is found in Hamilton
v. Bowie Lumber CoA In this case, the court had no difficulty
in finding the requisite possession of swamp land where there
had been carried on the raising and grazing of cattle, cutting
of timber and crossties, trapping, patrolling and posting of
signs, mineral leasing and geophysical operations, for a period
in excess of thirty years. However, where the only proven ac-
tivity was the infrequent and spasmodic cutting of timber, the
court held in Watkins v. Zeigler4 that this does not constitute
possession "sufficiently adverse" for the thirty-year prescrip-
tion. Whether this same activity would suffice as possession
for the ten-year prescription in good faith with just title was
not relevant and was not discussed, but conceivably a different
conclusion might have been reached. 5
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
The law provides different periods of time for the liberative
prescription of different kinds of causes of action. Presumably,
there were adequate policy reasons for these variations, although
it might be questioned whether it would not be a more satis-
factory system for our present times to have only one or two
broad classifications instead of the extremely numerous and
open systems in existence. Be that as it may, the classification
of the nature of the cause of action is often the critical factor
of decision. Thus, where suit is brought more than one year
after accrual of the cause of action but less than ten years, the
issue may be whether the right claimed is ex delicto or ex con-
tractu. In Reserve Ins. Co. v. Fabre,6 the trial court's judgment
for plaintiff was reversed by the court of appeal and then re-
instated by the Supreme Court. An automobile insurer paid
the collision damages to the insured and then as subrogee
brought the present suit against the borrower of the car whose
3. 147 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
4. 147 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
5. Of. Veltin v. Haas, 207 La. 650, 21 So. 2d 862 (1945) ; Ellis v. Prevost, 13
La. 230 (1839).
6. 243 La. 518, 149 So. 2d 413 (1963), reversing 140 So. 2d 438 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962), petition for writ of certiorari denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 49 (1963).
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negligence had caused the accident. Both the trial court and
court of appeal treated the suit as one in tort, differing on a
question of interruption of the one-year prescriptive period.
This point of view was in keeping with the parties' pleadings,
which were based on the same idea. Only upon rehearing in
the court of appeal was the ex contractu classification intro-
duced. All too often, the thought of car accident damage is
quickly taken to be synonymous with tort. Upon a more careful
analysis of the facts and relationships, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the borrower's responsibility to the car owner
derives from the loan contract between them, and that the bor-
rower's obligation to preserve and restore the thing is the basis
for his responsibility in damages when he fails to do so. 7 There-
fore, the action is based on a claim for reparation ex contractu
and subject only to the ten-year liberative prescription.8 That
the borrower's negligence was the cause of the accident does not
change the contractual relationship between the lender and the
borrower nor the ex contractu responsibility of the latter. The
distinction between delictual fault and contractual fault must
be maintained.9
The problem of how to classify legal relations resulting from
medical and dental services has given rise to some confusion.
Under Civil Code article 3538, the actions of physicians and
surgeons are prescribed by three years; it would be natural
to include dentists (dental surgeons) in this class. However,
where a prior contract is made for the professional services to
be rendered, it has been held that there is a contract between
the parties and therefore the ten-year prescription applies.10
In another case, it was held that a physician's bill is an "open
account" unless there is a contract." Similarly, an original
claim for services, subject to three-year prescription under ar-
ticle 3538, shifted to the ten-year general contract prescription
where the nature of the cause of action had been changed by a
written acknowledgment of the indebtedness.'2
In the case discussed above, 13 the distinction between de-
lictual fault and contractual fault was well explained and prop-
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2891 et seq., especially art. 2898 (1870).
8. Id. art. 3544.
9. See citations to French authorities Planiol, Laurent, and Dalloz in 149
So. 2d at 416.
10. Gore v. Veith, 156 So. 823 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934).
11. Myer v. Esteb, 75 So. 2d 421, 426 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
12. Hotard v. Fleitas, 67 So. 2d 345 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953).
13. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Fabre, 149 So. 2d 413 (La. 1963).
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erly maintained. A similar question was in issue in the case of
Phelps v. Donaldson,'4 where an orthodontist was defendant in
an alleged malpractice suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the court of appeal, holding that the action was one
in tort prescribed by one year, and was not ex contractu because
there had been no undertaking to "warrant" the success of
the work. The law on malpractice has developed pretty much
within the framework of torts. Without going into the merits
of this, from the point of view of legal analysis or social policy,
it suffices to limit the present discussion to the classification
of a relationship in order to fix the applicable period of pre-
scription. In the case under discussion, both the Supreme Court
and court of appeal accepted the idea that the ten-year pre-
scription would apply if the orthodontist had agreed to warrant
the success of his work, that is, that the relationship would have
been ex contractu and the claim would have sounded in contract.
This acceptance of the idea that the doctor-patient relationship
may be changed to a contractual relationship governed by the
ten-year prescription cannot logically be limited to a contract
of warranty; it should be just as significant for any specific
contract as distinguished from the simple rendition of medical
or dental services without discussion about what is involved or
about price. There may well be sound argument to question
the acceptance of any distinction altogether, but if it does exist,
why should it be limited to a contract of warranty? There is
room for "contractual fault" in other contracts as well.15 Ortho-
dontists generally require a written contract with a down pay-
ment and monthly payments for their services, and this puts
the relationship on a "contract" basis. Whether there was
failure to perform properly the duties of the contract was never
heard because the action was dismissed on the plea of one-year
prescription ex delicto.
If the orthodontist has a ten-year prescription within which
to assert his claims,16 the patient should have the same period
to assert claims arising out of the same relationship. However,
while keeping them the same, it would be more in accord with
what appears to be the intent of the codifiers to subject them
14. 142 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 150 So. 2d 35 (La. 1963).
15. Notwithstanding Sizeler v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd., 102
So. 2d 326 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958), cited as authority in 142 So. 2d at 587.
See also discussion of this question in Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir.
1959) ; and Don George, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 523
(W.D. La. 1956).
16. Gore v. Veith, 156 So. 823 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934).
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both to the three-year prescription of article 3538. The omnibus
provision of article 3544 establishes the ten-year prescription
for "all personal actions, except those before enumerated." These
other prescriptions of one and three and five years cover many
contractual relationships, such as sale, employment, transporta-
tion, lease, loan, and so forth. Likewise enumerated are the legal
relationships arising between master and servant, attorney and
client, doctor and patient, and so forth. If the attorney and
client or doctor and patient discuss and agree on the service to
be rendered and the fee to be charged, this does not change
their relationship and it could not have been intended that such
preliminary consensus would have the effect of changing the
applicable prescription.
Perhaps the best answer would be to take a more realistic
and more simplified view about the whole matter. Instead of
having so many different prescriptive periods, with the result-
ing manipulation of the classification of the nature of the cause
of action, all liberative prescriptions could be made uniform at
ten years, or perhaps limit the groups to two, using the five-
and ten-year terms. This would also take into account the tre-
mendous change in the modern economic system which is so
much predicated upon an extremely extensive credit basis, be-
cause the theory and policy of liberative prescription are that
a creditor loses his right by reason of his failure to exercise it
within a certain period during which he could have done so.
Another case involving a question of classfication of the
nature of the cause of action was Louisiana Industries, Inc. v.
Gibbens Bros. Const. Co. 1 7 The supplier under a building con-
tract sued the defaulting contractor and his surety, and the
latter pleaded the statutory one-year prescription from the
recordation of the acceptance of the work.' However, since the
surety had entered into an agreement through correspondence
promising to pay the amount offered and accepted in full re-
lease, there had been a novation which extinguished the original
obligation and substituted a new one.' 9 Accordingly, the ap-
propriate prescription was ten years under Civil Code article
3544.
In Succession of Danneel,20 the decedent had been an inter-
17. 144 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
18. LA. R.S. 9:4814 (1950).
19. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2185 et seq., 2189(1) (1870).
20. 152 So. 2d 29 (La. 1963).
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dict prior to her death and the curator had filed a provisional
account (including a doctor's bill) which was approved and
homologated by the district court. This account was not ren-
dered contradictorily with anyone, nobody had been notified,
there was no proof and no hearing. Such an account is not res
judicata, and did not interrupt the prescription which ran
against part of the doctor's claim for services. A minority of
the court would have granted a rehearing to consider whether
there had been a suspension of the running of time between the
start of the interdiction suit and the appointment of a curator.
This is not mentioned expressly in the official opinion of the
court, but a negative answer is necessarily implicit. The pre-
scription in this case was running against the doctor and not
against the interdict, but since there is so little material on
this particular point, it would have been useful to have a good
discussion and open treatment of the question whether during
this period the doctor had any avenue of recourse which he had
failed to exercise.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL LEASES
Implied Covenants
Kimbrough v. Atlantic Refining Co.1 raises the question of
the applicability of the implied covenant of diligent development
under an agreement compromising a dispute over lease develop-
ment. One producing well had been drilled on plaintiffs' lease.
As a result of a demand for further development a compromise
agreement was executed. Defendant lessee agreed to release all
but ninety acres of the leased tract. The agreement also pro-
vided that lessee would be free of further development obliga-
tions, except to protect against drainage, and that the lease
would remain in force as to the retained acreage "so long as pro-
duction is being obtained from said tract. '2
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 152 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
2. The pertinent portion of the agreement in question reads as follows: "In
consideration for the partial release so granted by Atlantic, lessors acknowledge
that said mineral leases are and shall remain in full force and effect insofar as
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